Reputation in Artificial Societies: Social Beliefs for Social OrderReputation In Artificial Societies discusses the role of reputation in the achievement of social order. The book proposes that reputation is an agent property that results from transmission of beliefs about how the agents are evaluated with regard to a socially desirable conduct. This desirable conduct represents one or another of the solutions to the problem of social order and may consist of cooperation or altruism, reciprocity, or norm obedience. Reputation In Artificial Societies distinguishes between image (direct evaluation of others) and reputation (propagating metabelief, indirectly acquired) and investigates their effects with regard to both natural and electronic societies. The interplay between image and reputation, the processes leading to them and the set of decisions that agents make on their basis are demonstrated with supporting data from agentbased simulations. |
Contents
Social Order Old Problems New Challenges and Reusable Solutions | 1 |
2 INFOSOCIAL CHALLENGES | 3 |
3 EMERGENT ORDER VS DESIGNED CONTROL | 4 |
SPONTANEOUS SOCIAL CONTROL | 5 |
5 IMPACT ON INFOSOCIETIES | 6 |
62 Content | 7 |
63 Assumptions | 8 |
64 Caveats and Limits | 9 |
3 MEMETIC QUESTIONS | 103 |
32 The Memetic Model of Transmissibility | 104 |
41 Whether and Why | 107 |
42 To whom | 109 |
44 How | 110 |
51 Whether to Transmit | 111 |
Fidelity and Fallacy in Reputation Transmission | 112 |
PREDICTIONS OF THE MODEL | 114 |
65 Valueadded | 10 |
66 To Whom It Is Addressed | 11 |
THE STATE OF THE ART | 13 |
Why Bother with Reputation? | 15 |
2 EARLIER VIEWS | 16 |
21 Honour | 17 |
23 Reputation | 19 |
3 CURRENT VIEWS | 20 |
32 What Is It Good For? Fields of Interest and Applications | 21 |
33 To Sum Up | 32 |
4 RECAPITULATION | 33 |
Theory and Practice of Cooperation Focusing on the Reputed Agent SUMMARY | 35 |
THE PRISONERS DILEMMA 21 Cooperation Social Order and Centralised Institutions | 37 |
22 Introduction to the Prisoners Dilemma | 38 |
MORE COOPERATION THAN EXPECTED | 43 |
41 Reputation and Trust Complementary Notions? | 49 |
5 RECAPITULATION | 50 |
The Shadow of the Future SUMMARY | 51 |
THE APPEARANCE OF TFT | 52 |
13 Infinitely repeated games | 53 |
Towards Reputation | 56 |
EXPERIMENTS | 57 |
FINITELY REPEATED GAMES 31 The Chain Store Paradox | 59 |
32 Uncertainty in the PD | 61 |
4 RECAPITULATION AND OPEN ISSUES | 62 |
42 Predictive power of rational cooperation | 63 |
REPUTATION TRANSMISSION | 65 |
An Alternative Perspective the Reputing Agent SUMMARY | 67 |
AGENTS | 68 |
21 Filtering beliefs | 69 |
23 Limited autonomy | 71 |
31 Image | 73 |
32 Reputation | 74 |
4 REPUTATIONBASED DECISIONS | 79 |
42 PragmaticStrategic | 80 |
5 RECAPITULATION | 81 |
Advantages of Reputation Over Repeated Interaction SUMMARY | 83 |
12 The Problem of Norms | 84 |
13 Description of the Model | 86 |
14 Results in Homogeneous Populations | 89 |
POPULATIONS | 90 |
Image | 92 |
the Role ol Reputation | 94 |
REPUTATION | 96 |
31 Deletion Strategy | 97 |
33 Findings | 98 |
4 RECAPITULATION | 100 |
Whether Why and Whom to Tell SUMMARY | 101 |
2 WHAT MEMETICS HAS TO SAY | 102 |
62 Combined Consequences | 115 |
RECAPITULATION AND SUGGESTIONS | 117 |
WHAT REPUTATION IS GOOD FOR | 119 |
Reciprocal Altruism Reconsidered SUMMARY | 121 |
2 THE SOLUTIONS | 122 |
22 TITFORTAT and the Evolutionary Metaphor for Reciprocity | 124 |
HOW DID RECIPROCITY EVOLVE? | 126 |
32 Paths to Reciprocity | 127 |
4 ANYTHING MISSING? | 133 |
42 The Adaptive Mind | 134 |
43 Social Cognitive Artefacts | 137 |
5 RECAPITULATION | 138 |
Informational Altruism | 139 |
2 ON GOSSIP | 140 |
21 Definitions | 141 |
Visavis the Society | 144 |
24 A Weapon of the Weak | 148 |
3 FOLLOWUP QUESTIONS | 149 |
4 RECAPITULATION | 151 |
False reputation | 153 |
11 Expected Results | 154 |
12 The Design of the Experiment | 155 |
2 | 156 |
21 Asymmetry between Calumny and Leniency | 158 |
DISCUSSION | 160 |
ADVANTAGES OF THE PRESENT APPROACH | 163 |
SOCIAL IMPACT OF REPUTATION | 165 |
2 PROBLEMS STILL UNSOLVED | 166 |
31 For Monitoring | 167 |
32 For Action | 169 |
4 RECAPITULATION | 171 |
Reputation in Infosocieties SUMMARY | 173 |
2 MISBEHAVIOUR IN ONLINE COMMUNITIES | 175 |
3 THE PROBLEM OF SHIFTING IDENTITIES | 176 |
41 ApplicationLevel Reputation Systems eBay | 179 |
42 Researchlevel Reputation Systems | 182 |
5 REPUTATION FOR MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS | 184 |
51 To Sum Up | 187 |
6 RECAPITULATION | 188 |
1 THE HELIX OF REPUTATION | 189 |
2 A PROCESSCENTRED APPROACH | 190 |
3 WEAPON OF THE WEAK | 191 |
5 FOR A DYNAMIC SOCIAL ORDER | 192 |
MACHINERY | 193 |
8 COURTESY ONLINE | 194 |
195 | |
207 | |
Other editions - View all
Reputation in Artificial Societies: Social Beliefs for Social Order Rosaria Conte,Mario Paolucci No preview available - 2011 |
Reputation in Artificial Societies: Social Beliefs for Social Order Rosaria Conte,Mario Paolucci No preview available - 2012 |
Common terms and phrases
acceptance aggression allows analysis applications artefacts Axelrod backward induction bad reputation behaviour beneficiaries benefit calumny Castelfranchi Chapter cheaters cognitive collaboration communication concerning Consequently cooperation costs cultural defection discussed dominance eBay effect emergence errors evolution evolutionary evolutionary game theory evolutionary psychologists example expected experimental experiments false reputation favour game theory given goals gossip human image and reputation implemented inclusive fitness indirect reciprocity individual infosocial institutions interesting kin selection maximisation mechanism memes memetic decision meta-belief multi-agent systems Nash equilibrium normative agents notion outcome partners payoffs phenomena players population positive potential Prisoner's Dilemma problem propagation punishment question rational recipient reciprocal altruism relevant repeated games repeated interaction reproduction reputation information reputation systems reputation transmission respectful agents retaliation sanctions selection sellers simulation social control social order societies sociobiological solution spread strategy target third parties transmit Trivers trust utilitarian violators
References to this book
The Law and Consumer Credit Information in the European Community: The ... Federico Ferretti No preview available - 2008 |