Reputation in Artificial Societies: Social Beliefs for Social OrderReputation In Artificial Societies discusses the role of reputation in the achievement of social order. The book proposes that reputation is an agent property that results from transmission of beliefs about how the agents are evaluated with regard to a socially desirable conduct. This desirable conduct represents one or another of the solutions to the problem of social order and may consist of cooperation or altruism, reciprocity, or norm obedience. Reputation In Artificial Societies distinguishes between image (direct evaluation of others) and reputation (propagating metabelief, indirectly acquired) and investigates their effects with regard to both natural and electronic societies. The interplay between image and reputation, the processes leading to them and the set of decisions that agents make on their basis are demonstrated with supporting data from agentbased simulations. |
Contents
6 | 11 |
SUMMARY | 13 |
2 | 19 |
2 | 27 |
FOCUSING | 35 |
2 | 36 |
5 | 50 |
5 | 56 |
TRANSMISSION | 112 |
RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM RECONSIDERED | 121 |
2 | 127 |
2 | 134 |
2 | 140 |
4 | 148 |
1 | 154 |
2 | 155 |
4 | 62 |
1 | 69 |
2 | 80 |
4 | 89 |
1 | 96 |
3 | 103 |
2 | 109 |
SOCIAL IMPACT OF REPUTATION | 165 |
REPUTATION IN INFOSOCIETIES | 172 |
1 | 179 |
1 | 187 |
7 | 193 |
Other editions - View all
Reputation in Artificial Societies: Social Beliefs for Social Order Rosaria Conte,Mario Paolucci No preview available - 2011 |
Reputation in Artificial Societies: Social Beliefs for Social Order Rosaria Conte,Mario Paolucci No preview available - 2012 |
Common terms and phrases
acceptance action aggression ALLD allows analysis application artefacts attack Axelrod backward induction bad reputation behaviour beneficiaries benefit Castelfranchi Chapter cheaters collaboration commitment communication concerning Consequently cooperation costs cultural defection discussed eBay effect emergence evaluation evolution evolutionary evolutionary game theory evolutionary psychologists example expected experimental experiments finitely repeated game theory goals gossip human image and reputation implemented inclusive fitness indirect reciprocity individual institutions interesting kin selection maximisation mechanism memes memetic decision meta-belief monopolist multi-agent systems Nash equilibrium normative agents notion obtain one's Ostrom outcome partners payoffs player population potential Prisoner's Dilemma problem propagation properties punishment question rational reasons recipient reciprocal altruism relevant repeated games repeated interaction reproduction reputation information reputation system reputation transmission retaliation simulation social control social dilemmas social order societies sociobiological solution spread stdev strategy target third parties transmit Trivers trust utilitarian utility violators